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Abstract
Many contemporary forms of oppression are not primarily the result of formally
organized collective action nor are they an unintended outcome of a combina-
tion of individual actions. This raises the question of collective responsibility. I
argue that we can only determine who is responsible for oppression if we un-
derstand oppression as a matter of social practices that create obstacles for so-
cial change. This social practice view of oppression enables two insights: First,
that there is an unproblematic sense in which groups can bear irreducible col-
lective responsibility for oppression. Second, that there are derived forms of in-
dividual responsibility for members of dominant groups.




On any plausible account of social justice, the continued existence of oppres-
sive practices and relations in contemporary societies must count as a failure
to live up to the standards of justice. Therefore, it is of decisive importance for
any theory of social justice to clarify who has which moral obligations in regard
to oppression, and in particular, to whom we should attribute moral responsi-
bility for oppression. 
While there are often individuals that are morally responsible for their contri-
butions to oppression, many theorists agree that many contemporary forms of
oppression – such as sexism and racism – are not well explained in their en-
tirety  as  an  outcome of  individual  moral  failures.  They are  always  at  least
partly a result of social practices for which it is often hard to attribute individ-
ual responsibility.1 We therefore might want to attribute some responsibility to
the members of the respective practices, not considered as individuals, but as
groups, i.e. collective responsibility. For example, one can claim that it is not
primarily individual men (or women) who are (individually) responsible for the
existence of sexism, but the group of all men (or perhaps even the group com-
prising men and women).
Almost all  contemporary accounts of collective responsibility focus either on
groups that have a formalized decision structure (i.e. corporate responsibility)
or on unorganized groups (such as mobs, bystanders of a crime or even human-
ity as a whole).2 But responsibility for most forms of oppression is not attribut-
able  to  group  activities  that  are  well  described  by  the  model  of  corporate
groups or by a model of unorganized collectivities. Phenomena such as racism
1 Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, 25; Haslanger, “Ontology and Social Construction,” 97.
2 French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, 14; May, The Morality of Groups, chap. 2; Petersson, 
“Collective Omissions and Responsibility,” 246; Smiley, “From Moral Agency to Collective Wrongs,” 194f.
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or sexism often cannot be explained exclusively by reference to collective ac-
tions that are unified by explicit rules or motivated by the intention to have
such effects.3 This raises a problem for the attribution of collective responsibil-
ity: the fact that the members of oppressive social practices often do not form a
formally organized group seems to preclude ascribing to them collective re-
sponsibility of the corporate kind.4 But the same phenomena are also not well
explained as emerging from completely uncoordinated behavior. In this article,
I argue that we can only find a way out of this apparent dilemma if we adopt an
appropriate account of oppression that is based on a particularly strong model
of social practices. Such a model allows us to see why, in spite of the absence of
a formal structure, those who occupy dominant positions in such a practice
nevertheless constitute a group to which we can ascribe a distinct kind of irre-
ducible collective responsibility.5
My argument proceeds as follows:
(1) It is defining for group oppression that members of the oppressed
group are caught in relationships regarding the structure of which they
lack transformative power (section 2).
(2) Almost all existing instances of group oppression depend on the ac-
ceptance of social norms that constrain the disadvantaged group as part
of a social practice (section 3).
(3) In such a practice, we can always identify a set of members that col-
lectively enjoys a dominant position and forms a social group in virtue of
3 Of course, how social practices are to be analyzed is a matter of controversy. For the most influential accounts, 
see Giddens, The Constitution of Society; Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice; Schatzki, Social Practices.) There 
are several accounts that defend a view of practices as involving some kind of group agency, for instance 
Tuomela, The Philosophy of Social Practices; Gilbert, “Social Rules as Plural Subject Phenomena.”
4 May and Strikwerda, “Men in Groups,” 145.
5 For the notion of irreducible group responsibility, see the classic analysis in Held, “Can a Random Collection of 
Individuals Be Morally Responsible?,” 474ff.
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that feature. This group has collective control over the norms and there-
fore bears backward-looking collective responsibility for the effects of op-
pression. Its members also bear (some) individual responsibility (section
4).
2. What is Oppression?
2.1 Oppression as Structural Social Phenomenon
I  take  phenomena  like  slavery,  sexism,  racism,  political  dictatorship  and
economic class exploitation to be paradigmatic instances of oppression.6 What
makes such phenomena oppressive is not just that they involve injustice.7 The
injustice characteristic for oppression is not primarily a matter of  outcomes,
but  a  matter  of  social  relationships between  people  or  groups  that  have  a
particularly  stable  and  permanent  character  and  that  are  supported  and
sustained by social or institutional mechanisms.8 
Furthermore,  most  forms  of  oppression  are  a  matter  of  relations  between
people  as  members of  groups –  such as  men and women,  ethnically  coded
groups or economic classes.9 Contemporary theories of oppression (developed
by  Iris  Marion  Young,  Ann  Cudd  and  Sally  Haslanger)  therefore  describe
oppression as an injustice which affects people as members of groups.10 
For instance, Haslanger proposes the following analysis of group oppression:
6 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 42; Zutlevics, “Towards a Theory of Oppression.”
7 Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, 23; Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 39f.; Zutlevics, “Towards a 
Theory of Oppression,” 83.
8 Natural circumstances (for example, the tendency for a disease to affect only one part of a population) can cause
differences in welfare or opportunities between groups that are undeserved and therefore unjust and that can 
give rise to a claim for compensation. As a result of such circumstances, unjust social relations can emerge 
between groups. However, we would not describe such relations in terms of oppression (other things being 
equal).
9 We could imagine that an individual keeps other people in a state of subservience to himself or herself based 
purely on individual capacities. However, cases of oppression that are based only on the actions of individuals 
and do not rely on any features of the social context at all are rare if not nonexistent. I will focus on cases of 
relations between social groups. See also Cudd, Analyzing Oppression; Haslanger, “Oppressions.”
10 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 42; Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, 25.
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for any individual x: x is oppressed as an F by an institution I in context C
iffdt x is an F in C and in C($R) ((being an F nonaccidentally correlates
with being disadvantaged by standing in an unjust relation R to others)
and I creates, perpetuates, or reinforces R.)11
In what follows, I would like to discuss whether such an analysis is sufficient
for  making  the  distinctive  features  of  oppression  explicit.  According  to
Haslanger's definition, one such distinctive feature is that only those unjust
relations  that  are  “perpetuated”  and  “reinforced”  by  an  institution  are
oppressive – suggesting that those subject to oppression are constrained by the
institution in such a way that ensures that the institution reproduces itself with
or without their consent. Similarly, Marilyn Frye argues that, from the point of
view of those who are subject to oppression, the relationships they stand in are
or appear as something from which they cannot easily extricate themselves:
The  experience  of  oppressed  people  is  that  the  living  of  one’s  life  is
confined and shaped by forces and barriers which are not accidental or
occasional and hence avoidable, but are systematically related to each
other […].12
While  these  statements  acknowledge  that  there  is  something  particularly
constraining about relations of oppression (in contrast, perhaps, to other forms
of injustice), it is not exactly clear what this constraint consists in. I would like
to offer the following suggestion: while almost all social practices, oppressive
or not,  constrain our activities in some respect,  and while almost all  social
practices  have  a  tendency  to  reproduce  themselves,  social  practices  only
become oppressive when they make those who suffer disadvantages from them
face  substantially  higher  costs  than  other  members  when  they  want  to
11 Haslanger, “Oppressions,” 113.
12 Frye, Politics of Reality, 4.
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challenge and change the structure of these relationships and when they face
these costs in virtue of their group membership. 
Take the following example:  we could imagine a world where the presently
existing  gendered  division  of  labor  in  families  exists  as  the  result  not  of
structural  gender  dominance,  but  as  a  result  of  some  merely  superficial
cultural pattern that women could easily change by criticizing it or by refusing
to participate. Assume that, in this imagined world, most women just don't care
enough to do something about it. In this hypothetical situation, it would still be
true  that  this  division  of  labor  would  be  unjust.  It  would,  however,  not  be
oppressive  because  women  would  have  the  option  of  easily  changing  the
practice  and  would  therefore  not  be  trapped  by  their  role.  The  difference
between this  hypothetical  world and actually  existing sexism is  that  sexism
makes it more difficult for women to change the social norms that define their
relationships  to  men  than it  would  be  in  the  absence  of  sexist  norms  and
practices.  In  particular,  sexism  is  supported  by  economic  and  cultural
structures that tend to reproduce the structure of gendered relationships.13 The
same point  is  made  by  Marxist  theories  of  capitalist  exploitation.  On  their
analysis,  capitalism not  only  harms workers,  it  also  systematically  deprives
them of the resources they would need to opt out of capitalism.14 To generalize
this argument, it is essential for oppression that the oppressed are not only
harmed by unfair social relationships, but that these relationships also make it
particularly difficult for the oppressed to change them. Thus, when Haslanger
13 Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, 149ff; McKitrick, “Liberty, Gender, and the Family,” 91ff; Haslanger, 
“What Is a (Social) Structural Explanation?”
14 Of course, some interpretations of Marxism suggest that there is no group that has comparatively more freedom 
than others, because capitalists (taken as individuals) cannot change the social practice either, as competition 
ensures that any action on their behalf would just make them proletarians. However, this is not true: individual 
capitalists have more resources they can use for anti-capitalist political projects; and, taken collectively, 
capitalists face fewer costs if they try to abolish capitalism (for instance, by donating all their capital to 
democratically run cooperatives or the state) as they do not have to overcome resistance by a class opposed to 
such a project (say, in the way workers do). See also Cohen, “The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom,” 22f.
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emphasizes that oppression necessarily involves an institutional practice that
“perpetuates” unjust relations and that the membership in a group is “non-
accidentally” correlated with standing in such a relation, we should understand
this to mean that oppression constrains members of the respective groups such
that they face obstacles when they want to change or leave that relation.15
Of  course,  none  of  this  is  to  deny  that  in  many  cases  of  oppression,  even
members  of  dominant  groups  face  substantial  costs  when  they  challenge
discriminatory or unjust norms, in particular, when they do so individually. But
to say that oppression structurally constrains subordinated groups by making it
particularly costly therefore does not need to imply that it is easy for individual
members of the dominant groups to challenge the relevant norms. Rather, the
condition that disadvantaged members must face disproportionately high costs
expresses the idea that unjust institutions are not oppressive merely in virtue
of their general stability, but rather in virtue of their specific disempowering
effect on the oppressed. Furthermore, even if oppressive practices are often
stabilized  by  the  threat  of  ostracism  towards  individual  members  of  the
dominant group who resist the practice, it is the case almost by definition that
the dominant group, if it were to act collectively to end the oppression, would
not face the social costs that subordinated groups regularly face collectively
when resisting oppression.
If we wish to capture this structurally constraining dimension of oppression, it
is therefore insufficient to define oppression as a self-perpetuating institutional
practice that causes unjust harm. We must add a second-order condition to that
15 Of course,  to  say  that  they  are  constrained  shouldn't  be  taken  to  mean that  the  oppressed  are  completely
incapable  of  challenging  relationships  of  oppression.  As  the  history  of  resistance  movements  shows,  the
oppressed almost always have some degree of agency. To say that they are oppressed just describes the fact that
they face disproportionate difficulties in freeing themselves from unjust social relations and that their agency is
situated within a structure that negatively determines the probability of success.
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definition: a practice is only oppressive if it constrains some participants by
creating obstacles that makes it disproportionately costly for them to change or
leave the practice (compared to other groups).16 This unequal distribution of
the capacity to change or exit a social relationship is a necessary condition for
such  a  relationship  being  oppressive.17 In  what  follows,  I  will  call  this  the
unequal capacity for change condition (UCCC). According to this condition, an
unjust practice must have two further features to count as oppressive. First, it
must be disproportionately difficult for one or several groups of participants to
change the structure of the practice. It is not enough that it is difficult for each
member, taken individually, to change the social relations constitutive of the
practice.  The difficulty  must  affect  subordinate groups,  even when they act
collectively. Second, this difficulty must be due to more than the general inertia
of  social  practices.  It  needs  to  exist  because  of  particular  features  of  the
practice – either being constituted or caused by it – and not because of other,
unrelated phenomena.
It is important to note that this constraint is an additional form of disadvantage
that oppressed people suffer, apart from the more direct outcomes of oppres-
sion. On the analysis defended here, oppression involves unjust outcomes and
unjust constraint. This distinguishes oppression from other forms of injustice.
In other words, there are relationships that are unjust solely on the dimension
of outcomes – consider, for example, companies, schools or social groups with
unfair internal practices where all those who are disadvantaged by the relevant
relationships can exit them without facing any more obstacles than other mem-
16 Of course, it is difficult to say how practices can be individuated; but the issue at hand concerns how difficult it
is for people to change their situation such that there is no institutional practice that harms them in the way
under discussion.
17 Susan Moller Okin (“‘Mistresses of Their Own Destiny’”; “Feminism and Multiculturalism”) draws special 
attention to the importance of exit options. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for Social Theory and 
Practice for bringing this to my attention.
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bers would face. Similarly, there can be relationships that involve unequal ca-
pacities for change and thus unjust constraint. Such relationships are unjust on
the structural dimension without necessarily involving unjust outcomes. Both
kinds of cases lack the convergence of both forms of injustice that is defining
for oppression.
To further illustrate the essential role of the UCCC for an adequate analysis of
oppression,  assume  that,  in  some  society,  there  are  criminal  gangs  the
members of which belong to a disadvantaged minority. These gangs exclusively
target members of the dominant majority. If this criminal behavior is regulated
by  informal  norms  to  the  extent  that  it  counts  as  a  social  practice,  and  if
members of the dominant majority are harmed by that practice, then there is a
correlation  between  suffering  this  harm  and  membership  in  the  dominant
majority. Nevertheless, in such a case, members of the majority are not – not
even to some small extent –  oppressed  by the minority. The main reason for
rejecting such a claim will often be that their dominance creates even more
harmful  outcomes for members  of  the minority  in other  contexts.  However,
there  is  another,  independent  reason  against  describing  this  situation  as
oppressive. Members of dominant groups usually have ample opportunity to
press for changes that are likely to reduce minority crime (even though they
might  resist  employing  measures  that  involve  giving  up  their  privileges).
Therefore, the practice in question does not unequally affect or constrain their
capacity to change the relationships that are responsible for the harm that they
suffer.  The  UCCC  is  consequently  not  fulfilled.18 This  illustrates  that
understanding  the  structural  dimension  of  oppression  on  a  model  which
emphasizes second-order obstacles blocks the faulty argument that, once an
18 For similar considerations, see Frye, Politics of Reality, 12.
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oppressive practice imposes some costs on the dominant group, “everyone is
oppressed” by it.19
The UCCC also sheds light on Iris Marion Young's analysis of the five “faces of
oppression”.20 Young claims that there are five irreducible features that can
make  a  practice  oppressive  –  powerlessness,  exploitation,  marginalization,
cultural imperialism, and violence. The UCCC analysis of oppression, I would
argue, makes clear that these features are – even one cannot reduce them to a
single one – unified by a common trait. While “powerlessness” most directly
relates  to  the  UCCC,  it  is  apparent  that  exploitation,  marginalization,  and
cultural imperialism are equally features of social life which all have the effect
that they make people unable to either leave or challenge the relationships
binding them to their oppressors. Violence, finally, should only be taken to be
oppressive (rather than merely unjust) if it has a systematic character – that is,
if it constrains or harms the agency of subordinated groups such that they no
longer have equal opportunity to challenge social norms.21
2.2 Oppression and Social Relationships
To examine the consequences of this structural analysis of oppression for the
question of  collective  responsibility,  it  is  worth looking at  the  concept  of  a
social relationship in more detail. I will suggest an analysis, building on Frank
Lovett's work, that assumes that two parties stand in a social relationship if
their choices are interdependent, that is, if the choices of the other party are
19 For an example of such a claim – based on a definition that reduces oppression to systematic harm – see New, 
“Oppressed and Oppressors?”
20 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, chap. 2.
21 This means that one has to be careful to distinguish the mere fact that a group of people is subject to a high risk 
of violence from the fact that they are systematically kept from changing this situation. The decisive feature of 
the violence against, for example, minorities, women, and gay and lesbian people that makes it a feature of 
oppression is that the violence that they experience poses an obstacle to their fighting for their interests and that 
their experience of violence does not count equally in public debates. They suffer disadvantages in their struggle
for equal protection that victims of “ordinary” crime do not suffer.
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relevant  at  least  for  some choices  of  their  own.22 The  structure  of  a  social
relationship can consequently be defined as the set of strategies available to
each party (that is, on the set of feasible plans that they can choose in reaction
to potential actions of the other party).23 What strategies are available for a
party  in a relationship depends on two kinds of  factors:24 on the  resources
available  to  them  and  on  the  norms  and  shared  meanings  that  structure
potential  responses,  including  institutional  rules,  legal  norms  and  cultural
expectations.25 Social relationships are consequently determined both by the
distributive and by the normative features of a society.
If we want to analyze oppression in terms of the UCCC on this model, we need
to  take into  account  how structures  of  relationships  determine the  relative
distribution  of  second-order  action  options  among  groups.  Second-order
actions are actions that change the structure of social relationships between
groups.  For  example,  people  can  change  social  relationships  by  creating,
destroying  or  redistributing  resources  or  by  communicating  information.
However,  relationships  can  also  be  changed  by  challenging,  changing  or
reinforcing social norms. The crucial insight gained by adopting the vocabulary
of  “second-order  action  options”  is  that  challenging  the  rules  of  a  social
relationship  (or  leaving  a  social  relationship26)  is  not  properly  analyzed  as
merely the exercise of action opportunities within a social relationship. Rather,
acting in these ways amounts to an exercise of the capability to act in a way
22 Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice, 34; Weber, Economy and Society, 26f.
23 Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice, 42.
24 Here, I roughly follow Giddens, The Constitution of Society, xxxi, although I adopt a somewhat more simplistic 
definition of rules and resources for the present purpose.
25 In his analysis of domination, Lovett, surprisingly, chooses to treat the rules of social institutions as “artificial 
laws of nature” (Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice, 42.).
26 “Exit” is another form of second-order action next to normative change, or “voice” (see Hirschman's classic 
distinction in Exit, Voice and Loyalty.); however, as this option is less important for an analysis on the level of 
large-scale groups (who often cannot realistically decide to no longer interact), I will not discuss it here in any 
detail.
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that  changes the relationship itself. That is, these are actions that determine
the structure of subsequent interactions between participants.27
If  it  is  disproportionately  costly  for  one party,  but  not  for  other  parties,  to
challenge the rules determining the structure of  a social  relationship (or to
leave the relationship altogether), this means that choices regarding whether
and how this structure changes are effectively up to the other parties. If the
relationship is one that causes unjust harm, those who suffer much higher costs
than  others  when  they  attempt  to  challenge  its  structure  due  to  such
disproportionate costs can therefore be said to be trapped in the relationship in
the way that is characteristic for oppression. It is important to note, however,
that such a structure does not preclude agency or resistance of the oppressed –
historically and in the present, many oppressed groups have challenged and
challenge oppression by bearing these costs. But this does not change the fact
that they would have not had to face them if they had not been oppressed. 
These considerations suggest the following analysis of group oppression:
Group oppression:
The members of a group G suffer from oppression  as members of that
group if and only if: 
1. There  is  an  (institutional)  practice28 I  that  creates  or  sustains  a
relationship R between members of G and members of other groups,
such that R causes unjust harm.
2. I systematically creates constraints that impose substantially higher
costs on members of G that attempt change the unjust structure of R
or to leave R, compared to other practice members (this is UCCC).
27 This is also suggested by Foucault's definition of power as action upon actions (Foucault, “The Subject and 
Power,” 789.), see also Moss, The Later Foucault, 177.
28 By an “institutional practice”, I mean a practice in which rules are accepted that lead to people having different 
roles or statuses. It does not entail any stronger sense of “institution”.
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3. These constraints affect members of G non-accidentally by virtue of
their membership.29
In  the  next  section,  I  will  argue  that,  in  many  cases,  the  mode  in  which
oppressive constraints are imposed essentially relies on the shared agency of
groups.  This  provides  a  conceptual  link  between  oppression  and  collective
responsibility.
2.3 Types of Oppression
Having argued that the UCCC is a necessary condition of oppression, I would
like to distinguish between three forms that the relevant constraints can take
and, correspondingly, three types of oppression.30 This prepares the way for an
argument showing that one of these types is essential for all empirical cases of
group oppression and intrinsically linked to group agency. 
The first mode in which people can be kept from changing social relationships
is through coercion or physical violence. This is not only the case in phenomena
like  slavery.  The  disproportionate  probability  that  ethnic  minorities  face  in
becoming victims of police brutality and the disproportionate risk of suffering
sexual assault that women face can also be (partially) understood as forms of
social control through which these groups are kept from challenging prevailing
social norms.31 This mechanism and the corresponding type of oppression could
be called “coercive”.
Second, members of disadvantaged groups can also be kept from challenging
oppressive  relationships  by  dominant  groups  denying  them  access  to  the
resources they need to do so. In the case of economic oppression in terms of
29 On non-accidentality, see Haslanger, “Oppressions,” 114.
30  It goes without saying that existing forms of oppression usually combine several of these forms and features.
31 See for a classic statement Brownmiller, Against Our Will.
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the way that the classic Marxist model presents it, workers cannot leave their
relationship of subservience to capitalists because the structure of the labor
market ensures that they are (by and large) unable to save enough to establish
themselves as independent producers.32 Similarly, many activists argue that the
poor are systematically excluded from the political processes that shape their
economic  situation  when  there  is  a  predominance  of  private  financing  of
political campaigns. However, the availability of resources also has importance
beyond the narrowly economic case. People with a disability need access to
streets and public buildings of a certain kind in order to be able to participate
meaningfully  in  the  very  processes  that  shape  the  regulations  for  such
resources.33 Similarly, speakers of minority languages need cultural resources
provided  in  a  language  they  can  understand.  We  can  also  understand
knowledge and education as a resource. Relationships that deny groups the
opportunity  to  access  the  education  they  would  need  to  resist  the  norms
imposed by these relationships are also a source of oppression. This second
form can be called “resource” oppression.
Finally, we can also include “ideological” power as a source of oppression – that
is, the protection of social norms by way of systems of belief and reasoning that
serve to instill false beliefs or discredit criticism. One particularly important
type of such ideological power concerns the way in which social relationships
are shaped by the imposition of social meaning on actions and people.34 “Social
meaning” refers to schemata that connect some features of a group to kinds of
social statuses that make certain actions towards its members appropriate or
inappropriate.  We  can,  for  example,  understand  gender  and  race  as  the
32 Cohen, “The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom.”
33 I am grateful to Sally Haslanger for pointing out these additional aspects of oppression which I had not 
considered in my original formulation of the distinction.
34 See Haslanger, “Distinguished Lecture,” 5.
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imposition of social meaning onto real or imagined bodily differences between
people.  Such impositions of  meaning often create obstacles for  members of
disrespected  groups  that  keep  them  from  challenging  social  rules.  One
particularly important mechanism by which such impositions of meaning can
become oppressive is epistemic injustice.35 In many contexts, people take the
arguments  and  the  evidence  presented  by  women  or  minorities  as  less
important  for  the  regulation  of  their  beliefs  compared  to  arguments  or
evidence presented by men. This is not only an injustice as such, it also makes
it  more  difficult  for  women and  minorities  to  attack  the  cultural  schemata
standing behind these mechanisms, as any reference to their experience will
have less force than it would have in their absence.  This type of oppression
depends on the social acceptance of norms. Thus, it can be called “normative”
oppression.36
3. Oppression and Social Practices
So far, I have defended a conception of oppression that includes as a central
element the obstacles that institutional practices create for groups regarding
the possibility of social change. In what follows, I  will  argue that important
instances of  oppression in contemporary societies involve the acceptance of
social  norms.  I  will  also  argue  that  such acceptance of  norms involves  the
members  of  a  practice  as  a  non-corporate  collective  agent  and  that  it  is
therefore  wrong  to  see  such  oppression  only  as  the  outcome  of  individual
35 See Fricker, “Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege”; Dotson, “Conceptualizing Epistemic 
Oppression”; Fricker, Epistemic Injustice.
36 To avoid misunderstandings, it should be emphasized that in most instances of oppression, the institutional 
practices systematically affect members of the disadvantaged group in several of these dimensions: sexism is 
not merely a cultural phenomenon but it also makes women suffer from economic disadvantages and increased 
risks of violence, just as exploitation is normally not merely economic but also includes cultural aspects. 
Nevertheless, the distinctions are useful to see the crucial differences between different forms of oppression. 
Furthermore, this categorization of types of oppression is not supposed to constitute a list of distinct types of 
oppression, but rather an incomplete overview of typical mechanisms of oppression.
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activities.  This  prepares  the  ground  for  the  attribution  of  collective
responsibility that I discuss in the next section.
3.1 Imposition of Meaning
While  one  might  argue  that  some  forms  of  oppression  –  for  example,  the
oppression constituted by the economic dominance of the global North over the
global  South  –  are  purely  based  on  economic  power,  it  is  clear  that  many
central cases of oppression do not only function by using physical violence or
resource  deprivation.  For  instance,  there  cannot  be  a  convincing  theory  of
racism and sexism that refers exclusively to violence or economic exclusion as
the mechanisms sustaining such inequalities. It is these phenomena that I will
focus on in what follows. 
Any explanation of  how they meet the UCCC must take the social  meaning
projected onto members of disadvantaged groups into account. How should we
analyze  the  cultural  imposition  of  meaning?  We  can  understand  cultural
impositions  of  meaning  following  (very  roughly)  John  Searle's  theory  of
institutional facts. According to Searle, institutional facts are created by the
collective  acceptance  of  a  constitutive  rule  of  the  form “X  counts  as  Y  in
context C”.37 X refers to an action, person or object under some description and
Y  refers  to  an  “institutional  status”  that  can  be  spelled  out  in  terms  of  a
commitment that some behavior towards X is correct or incorrect. There can be
highly institutionalized forms of such rules, such as “Two previously unmarried
adults who have voluntarily stated in front of a certified official that they want
to be married, count as married”. However, although Searle wants to confine
this analysis only to statuses that rest on explicitly accepted rules, it is useful
37 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 28. On constitutive rules, see Hindriks, “Constitutive Rules, 
Language, and Ontology.”
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for my purposes to assume that there can also be more informally defined and
more implicitly accepted rules, such as “All people exhibiting some perceived
or imagined bodily properties, ancestry, language, culture and demeanor count
as Hispanics” or “People with certain perceived or imagined bodily properties
whose  behavior  conforms to  norms of  gentleness,  care  and  submissiveness
count as typically feminine”.
The  acceptance  of  constitutive  rules  that  impose  meaning  on  people  and
actions is only oppressive whenever the Y term includes norms that make it
substantially more difficult for those who fall under the X term (compared to
other members) to challenge the acceptance of the rule or to leave the group
where such a rule is accepted (as required by the UCCC). If it is part of the rule
underlying ascriptions of femininity that the experiences of feminine women
count as less relevant (perhaps, because it is legitimate to assume that their
reactions are capricious, irrational, emotional, and so forth), then such women
will  face  obstacles  whenever  they  want  to  bring  up  their  experiences  as
reasons for why such a rule should not be accepted.
3.2 Norms, rules, and practices
What does it mean that a constitutive, meaning-imposing rule is “collectively
accepted” in some context? While Searle assumes that the institution of social
statuses requires what he calls “collective intentionality,”38 I want to argue that
meaning-imposing rules need not be consciously or even intentionally accepted
in order to  acquire normative force.  People  often create social  practices of
these types by  practically accepting  it (in some sense) as legitimate that X's
may be treated as Y's. For example, the meaning of “typically feminine” could
38 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 23. See however his different account in Searle, Making the Social 
World. The Structure of Human Civilization.
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imply that the opinions of people that are identified as typically feminine can be
treated as having less credibility regarding technical problems. We might then
say that such a rule is socially accepted in some group whenever it is accepted
as appropriate within that group that opinions are treated in this way.39
But what does “practical acceptance” mean? H.L.A. Hart has famously argued
that there not only needs to be a convergence of behavior in some community
in order for there to be a norm that is followed in that community.40 There also
needs also to be a  convergence of attitudes in the sense that the behavior is
seen  as  legitimate,  and  that  deviating  behavior  is  seen  as  illegitimate  and
sanctions towards illegitimate behavior as justified. For a community to accept
the norm that “women count as unreliable epistemic interaction partners”, it is
not sufficient that everyone treats women's testimony as less valuable. It also
needs to be the case that everyone treats such treatment of women's testimony
as unproblematic and that any deviation from the prescribed behavior (such as
arguing that a man is, in virtue of his sex, prima facie less reliable than woman)
will be met with disapproval.41 It is important to see that Hart's conception of
what it means to follow a norm is more demanding than a conception that only
requires  a  shared  regularity  of  behavior,  but  that  it  nevertheless  does  not
require any explicit beliefs about there being such a norm in place.42
Hart's  conception of  social  practice is  particularly  useful  to understand the
difference  between  a  community  merely  conforming  to  a  rule  (from  the
observer perspective) and it following a rule (from the participant perspective).
39 This example makes it apparent that conditions that the X term captures can themselves include institutional or 
cultural ascriptions.
40 See Hart, The Concept of Law, 86–91; Shapiro, “What Is the Internal Point of View?”
41 Hart argues that the convergence of behavior does not tell us anything about the fact that people treat the social 
rule as reason-giving.
42  It is also important to note that, on this account, the community that follows the norm can, but need not, include
those to whom the norm is applied.
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I will argue, however, that the combination of a convergence of behavior with a
convergence of attitudes is not enough to capture the existence of social norms
in  a  strong  sense.43 Assume  that  there  is  a  community  in  which  everyone
behaves according with some regularity R, and in which everyone is disposed
to  criticize  others  whenever  they  deviate  from  R.  However,  there  is  no
disposition on the side of  any member to  take such criticism seriously.  No
member sees any other member as authorized to judge competently about her
performances. While we might say that, in such a community, each member
accepts the validity of the norm individually, we should not say that they follow
the rule  together,  for they lack the readiness to take others' interpretations
regarding the meaning of the norm into account. 
We can, therefore, distinguish a weak from a strong form of norm-governed
practices. A practice is governed by a norm N in the strong sense whenever (1)
the members of that practice are disposed to follow N and to evaluate each
other's  behavior  according to  N,  and  (2)  the  members  of  that  practice  are
disposed to take others' evaluations regarding the conformity of their behavior
with N seriously, or, in other words, attribute authority to others regarding the
meaning of N.44 
Having introduced this distinction, I would like to suggest that the persistence
of  oppressive  cultural  impositions  of  meaning  can  only  be  explained  if  we
assume that practices like racism and sexism feature norms of the stronger
type.45 Even though there is a strong focus in recent discussions on apparently
43 See also Coleman and Leiter, “Legal Positivism.”
44 Stahl, “Institutional Power.” Of course, the reasons for individuals to engage in such strongly social-normative 
practices can range from instrumental interest in upholding their dominance, a cultural identification with the 
group to merely traditional acceptance of authority.
45 For the connection between prejudices and social norms, see the overview in Sechrist and Stangor, “Prejudice as
Social Norms.”
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individual  phenomena  like  prejudice  and  implicit  bias,46 the  imposition  of
meaning onto women and racialized people should not simply be understood as
a  convergence  of  individual  attitudes.  Rather,  there  is  strong  social
psychological evidence that that people routinely readjust their conceptions of
the meaning of race and gender along social norms and that intersubjective
acceptance plays a decisive role in how individual participation in racist and
sexist practices develops.47 Furthermore, the very persistence of such meaning
is in part to be explained by the fact that it is often not enough to change
individuals' minds about the applicability of stereotypes. Stereotypes are self-
reinforcing  in  the  sense  that  deviating  from culturally  acceptable  forms  of
stereotyping typically comes with a social cost.48 This evidence suggests that
the  oppressive  character  of  such  norms  is  partly  to  be  explained  by  a
willingness  of  the  practice  members  to  recognize  others  as  authorities.
Furthermore, the model proposed here assumes that social norms are not so
much a matter of finding certain behavior individually acceptable but of acting
within social relationships which incorporate norms that prescribe certain ways
of acting. Therefore, this model does not describe normative oppression as a
result of the convergence of individual racist or sexist attitudes but rather as
the result of sexist and racist practices that can persist even when individuals
are not explicitly or implicitly biased.49
3.3 Social Practices as Group Phenomena
46 See Brownstein, “Implicit Bias.” For an overview of relevant research, see Jost et al., “The Existence of Implicit
Bias is beyond Reasonable Doubt”; in relation to responsibility, see Holroyd, “Responsibility for Implicit Bias.”
For a critique of the exclusive focus on implicit bias, see Haslanger, “Distinguished Lecture.”
47 For evidence, see Blanchard, Lilly, and Vaughn, “Reducing the Expression of Racial Prejudice”; Blanchard et 
al., “Condemning and Condoning Racism”; Crandall, Eshleman, and O’Brien, “Social Norms and the 
Expression and Suppression of Prejudice”; Monteith, Deneen, and Tooman, “The Effect of Social Norm 
Activation on the Expression of Opinions Concerning Gay Men and Blacks.” and Sherif 1953
48 Schachter, “Deviation, Rejection, and Communication.”
49 I understand bias to be a mental disposition to act or to attribute properties to people which is inherently unfair.
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If we assume that the cultural imposition of meaning in oppressive practices
involves  norms  of  the  strong  type  –  i.e.,  norms  backed  by  a  practice  that
involves a readiness to take others' interpretations into account –, this implies
that there is a structure of  mutual ascription of authority  in the group that
accounts for the existence of these norms.50 This means that such norms are
not  reducible  to  individual  attitudes.  As  each  attitude  is  subject  to  further
correction and evaluation, no individual attitude (nor the sum of all of them)
determines “the rule of the group”.51 If we want to find out what the accepted
norms suggest for some particular case,  we should not look at some set  of
individual  attitudes  taken  in  isolation  from  each  other  but  rather  at  the
interaction within the group.52 In this sense, the acceptance of any given norm
can be ascribed only to the group as a whole, and not to any individual.53 On
such an account, we can understand  sexism, for example, as an instance of
oppression because it structures the relationships between men and women
such that there is an imposition of meaning on the behavior of women due to
which they face unequal obstacles in their attempts to change this imposition
or to leave this relationship. In the corresponding practice, there must not only
be a shared disposition to find it acceptable to treat people according to certain
gender  norms  but  also  a  shared  disposition  to  attribute  authority  to  other
members regarding the interpretation of these norms.54 Within such a practice,
those who stand in these relations to each other (often including the oppressed
members  of  the  practice)  form  a  group  to  which  we  can  attribute  the
50 See Stahl, “Institutional Power.”
51 Stahl, “The Conditions of Collectivity.”
52 Stahl, Immanente Kritik. Elemente Einer Theorie Sozialer Praktiken.
53 For a group model of social practice, see also Gilbert, “Social Rules as Plural Subject Phenomena”; Gilbert, 
“Social Rules” and my critique in Stahl, “The Conditions of Collectivity.”
54 Such a disposition could be technically also called a “bias” (as in: a bias to socially conform). But while 
“implicit bias” accounts see (morally undesirable) features of individual psychology as the fundamental cause of
oppressive outcomes, the model proposed locates the final origin of oppression in shared attitudes that can be 
upheld even by people who are not biased as part of their individual psychology.
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acceptance of the norms that are constitutive of the imposed meaning.
This insight not only raises the question of collective responsibility, it also has
immediate  political  consequences:  if  oppression  is  not  just  a  matter  of
individual  attitudes,  but  rather  of  the collective processes  by which certain
kinds of behavior are designated as acceptable or unacceptable, then a political
strategy for fighting oppression must not only focus on people changing their
individual attitudes or fighting their implicit biases, but also on the structure of
social relationships and practices in which racist or sexist norms can survive
independently of people's individual attitudes.
4. Who is responsible for oppression?
So far,  I  have argued that  the  imposition of  social  meaning,  as  one of  the
central mechanisms responsible for the existence of oppression, depends on
social practices. These practices constitute those who collectively follow and
enforce their norms as a group, in the sense that the existence of the norm has
to be primarily  accounted for in terms of  the interaction within  that  group
instead of individual attitudes. Somewhat surprisingly, we can therefore often
say  that  both  dominant  and  subordinate  group  members  share  a  group
membership as long as they are collectively engaged in norm enforcement.
While  it  seems  to  be  clear  that  it  is  appropriate  to  ascribe  outcome
responsibility to such groups, it is less clear whether we also can ascribe moral
responsibility  to  them  and,  if  so,  what  kind  of  moral  responsibility.  Young
famously  argues  that  the  right  kind  of  moral  responsibility  to  focus  on  in
connection  with  structural  injustices  is  not  liability (which  is  backwards-
looking) but what she calls the “responsibility of connection” (which is forward-
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looking).55 One of the main reasons she cites for this is that a liability model of
responsibility will tend to apportion blame to individual agents. Such individual
ascriptions of responsibility are, Young argues, not only counterproductive but
also impossible.56
While  I  agree  that  it  is  often  not  appropriate  to  attempt  to  determine  the
contribution of particular individuals to the persistence of oppressive practices
and  that  it  might  be  politically  unhelpful  to  talk  about  responsibility  for
oppression mainly in terms of blame, the question of backward-looking moral
responsibility for oppression remains important.  First,  in order to argue for
meaningful  social  change,  we have to attribute causal  responsibility  for  the
persistence of oppression to some entity to find out to whom we should direct
our  arguments.  Such attributions naturally  also raise the question of  moral
responsibility.  Second,  to  convince  people  that  they  have  a  forward-looking
“responsibility of connection”, we must often make an argument to the effect
that  they  are  morally  connected  to  existing  forms  of  oppression  in  some
relevant  way.  Third,  blame  is  not  the  only  possible  way  to  relate  to  past
injustices for which one bears responsibility. Rather, once we see that there are
different kinds of backwards-looking responsibility that can stem from one's
membership in a group, we can see that  there are other,  more appropriate
reactive attitudes by which we can respond to an attribution of responsibility.57
In  what  follows,  I  will  argue that there are  two forms of  backward-looking
responsibility which we can appropriately ascribe to people who are implicated
in oppressive social practices. First, the social practice account developed thus
far allows us to see that those members of the practice who are not oppressed
55 Young, Responsibility for Justice, chap. 4.
56 Ibid., 105ff.
57 Feinberg, “Collective Responsibility (Extended Version),” 75; Anderson, The Imperative of Integration, 74; 
May, Sharing Responsibility, 109, 120.
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(the  “dominant”  members)  form a  group  that,  as  a  group,  bears  collective
responsibility for the existence of  oppression (4.1).  Second, the members of
this  group  can  also  usually  be  attributed,  to  various  degrees,  shared
responsibility as individuals for the harmful outcomes of oppression (4.2). 
4.1 Collective responsibility of dominant members
There are three models of groups that dominate the present discussion about
collective responsibility:58 the corporation (a group with a formal structure that
enables it to take collective decisions and adopt collective beliefs), the mob (a
group characterized by the immediate identity of attitudes and a suppression of
individuality)59 and the dispersed group of people (a group of individuals that
do  not  in  any  sense  act  jointly,  such  as  random  bystanders).60 Typically,
theorists only consider the corporation and the mob (by virtue of their unified
agency) as candidates for collective responsibility. Whereas in the case of the
dispersed group, it is often held that there might be a weak form of individual
responsibility  of  the  members  who  ought  to  attempt  to  create  a  collective
agent,  but there is  a  consensus that  there is  no collective  responsibility  as
such.61 The problem with these models is that the groups that uphold social
practices that are the source of oppression do not conform to any of them.62
The oppression of women or minorities is not (usually) the result of formally
organized and planned group agency. However, even though some theorists try
58 May, The Morality of Groups, chap. 2; Petersson, “Collective Omissions and Responsibility,” 246; Smiley, 
“From Moral Agency to Collective Wrongs,” 194f.For the more general discussion about collective 
responsibility, see also Smiley, “Collective Responsibility.”
59 On the responsibility of mobs, see May, The Morality of Groups, chap. 4.
60 Isaacs (Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, 25.) makes a further distinction between corporate agents 
and “goal-oriented collectives”. However, as members of practices typically do not act together in the pursuit of 
a goal, I will not pursue this distinction here.
61 Held, “Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible?,” 98; Collins, “Collectives’ Duties 
and Collectivization Duties”; Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, chap. 5.
62 Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, 26.
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to use it as a model63, the groups that uphold long-standing racist practices are
also not adequately categorized as mobs, that is, as groups of people that are
largely  conformist  and  who  act  unreflectively.  Racist  social  practices  often
persist over extended periods of time and do not require that people suppress
individual impulses or reflection. They are also often characterized by internal
disagreements, struggles and a divergence of interests which does not give rise
to any joint actions based on a clear sense of unproblematic identity.64 Finally,
social  practices  are  also  not  merely  an  unintended  result  of  individual
interactions. So far, the debate about collective responsibility has not produced
a model of groups which is suitable to capture the form of collective behavior
that is typical of normatively governed social practices.
The “corporate” model of  collective responsibility  assumes structured social
groups (such as corporations) in which there exists some mechanism by which
group decisions can be made – for example by designating officials who are
authorized to act in the name of the group.65 It is not difficult to see that this
structures the actions of the group such that the group forms an agent in its
own right.  We therefore  often think of  corporations  as groups that  can act
independently.66
The type of group that is involved in a social practice shares one aspect with
corporations without having a corporate structure: I have argued that there are
norms in such groups, supported by relations of authority, that block certain
63 May, The Morality of Groups, 73ff.
64 In this respect the model proposed here is simplifying as it does not consider how, within dominant groups, 
other forms of inequalities of social power structure social conflicts about norm interpretations, which is 
especially important when one considers the intersection of race and class oppression. The social practice view 
developed here, also allows for a fluid character of oppressive character over time and changes in the meaning 
which is imposed that develop both in response to struggles within the dominant groups and in response to 
challenges by the oppressed. This feature can even allow for a reconceptualization of all forms of oppression as 
transitory phases in larger struggles – a historical perspective that cannot be developed here further.
65 As in the classic account of French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, 41.
66 Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts.
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members from effectively challenging the norms of the practice. The existence
of  such  norms gives  rise  to  three  distinct  kinds of  positions  that  can  exist
within such a social practice: there are those who lack a substantive capacity to
challenge this structure of authority and who have a position that exposes them
to  some  harm  (“the  oppressed”),  there  are  those  who  lack  a  substantive
capacity to challenge the structure of authority (or who are not attributed any
authority) but who are not exposed to harm (“bystanders” or powerless groups
that are not oppressed), and finally there are the “dominant” members who
enjoy  authority  over  the  norms  and  thus  collectively  have  a  substantive
capacity to change them.67 While individual members of the dominant group
face costs when challenging oppressive norms (namely the disapproval of other
dominant  members),  these  costs  are,  by  definition,  lower  than  the  costs
oppressed members face in the same situation. Taken as a group (which is part
of the larger group of practice members), however, the dominant members do
not face any obstacles when wanting to challenge the authority structure. The
dominant group collectively enjoys effective power over what the norms of the
larger group are.68 In oppressive practices, the subgroup of dominant members
is therefore  in control  of the larger group's acceptance or non-acceptance of
the relevant norms.69 Therefore, the group of practice members as a whole is
internally structured in a way that is similar to corporate agents. However, this
internal “division of labor” does not make the larger group into a corporate
67 The membership in one of these groups is thus determined by social power and capacities, not by mental 
features. A member of the oppressed group, for example, may be misled by his or her ideological beliefs and 
thus cognitively incapable of entertaining a world without oppressive norms. But such a person would still count
as having a social capacity to change them on this account.
68 I intentionally don't use the vocabulary of “privilege” here. “Privilege” seems to refer to the consequences of a 
practice, while “dominance” refers to the second-order power distribution. Groups can be dominant without 
being privileged and vice versa (i.e. bystanders).
69 It is important to emphasize that the group is only collectively in control, without any individual member being 
in control (see Hindriks, “The Freedom of Collective Agents”); the same (perhaps) holds for the group of 
practice members as a whole (which is unproblematic as multiple groups can be in control of some activity), but
not (it is supposed) for the oppressed group.
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agent  properly  speaking.  Even  though  there  is  someone  (the  dominant
members) in control of the group's normative behavior, this arguably does not
enable  the  larger  group  to  make  decisions  or  take  on  commitments.
Furthermore, the group formed by the dominant members itself usually does
not display a corporate structure. Men, as the group positioned as dominant in
sexism, and “whites”, as the group positioned as dominant in racism, do not
have an internal decision structure or designated officials. Even once we have
identified  such  groups  as  the  agents  that  are  in  control  of  the  respective
practices,  we  still  do  not  know  on  what  model  we  should  analyze  their
responsibility.
Many  theorists  of  group  responsibility  assume  that  groups  can  only  be
collectively responsible if they fulfill certain strong conditions that make them
into agents.70 Margaret Gilbert, for example, claims that, to act collectively, the
members of groups must be unified by a “joint commitment” to some collective
goal.71 Philip  Pettit  has  adopted a  different  model  that  sees groups as  only
having responsibility if they are what he calls autonomous agents, that is, if
their  members  do  not  only  “each  intend  that  together  they  mimic  the
performance of a single unified agent”,72 but also if they “embrace a practice or
constitution that allows them to ensure that the body of attitudes they accept
and enact in the group’s name is internally consistent”.73 These conditions are
clearly too strong to be fulfilled by the groups formed by dominant members of
oppressive practices.
However, even though these groups usually do not fulfill these conditions, the
way in  which Gilbert  and Pettit  actually  defend their  theories  suggest  that
70 For a critical discussion of this, see Smiley, “From Moral Agency to Collective Wrongs.”
71 Gilbert, On Social Facts.
72 Pettit, “Responsibility Incorporated,” 179.
73 Ibid., 182.
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these conditions do not capture their intentions in the case of oppression and
that oppressive groups should, after all, be collectively responsible. Gilbert, for
instance, argues that only “joint commitments” can explain three features of
group agents: a form of unity that goes beyond mere aggregation, the existence
of social rights and obligations between members, and the fact that individual
members  cannot  quit  the joint  activity  without  violating some obligation to
others.74 As the case of racism and sexism shows, normative social practices
can display these three features even though they are not grounded in joint
commitments: the structure of mutual authorization in such practices accounts
for the unified behavior of the respective groups. The same structure explains
why members must accept the obligation to take each other's interpretation
into account. Finally, members of such practices also share a commitment to
the rules that is violated when they unilaterally quit cooperating.
A similar argument can be made regarding Pettit's  analysis:  he argues that
groups that are fit to be held responsible must be capable of making significant
choices as groups and that they must be able to acquire an understanding of
the normative significance of their choices.75 While Pettit spells out the capacity
to make choices as the capacity to engage in joint action according to a model
of interlocking individual intentions,76 this is not the only way to understand
this  capacity.  Kenneth  Shockley  argues,  for  instance,  that  groups  can  be
responsible in Pettit's sense even in the absence of joint intentions as long as
we  can  say  that  the  group  as  a  whole  has  some form of control  over  the
conditions that enable individuals' actions to cause harm.77 In norm-governed
social  practices,  the  group's  structure  of  norm  acceptance  constrains  the
74 Gilbert, “Foundations and Consequences of Collective Moral Responsibility.”
75 Pettit, “Responsibility Incorporated,” 174.
76 Ibid., 179.
77 Shockley, “Programming Collective Control,” 446.
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individuals, which puts the group rather than the individuals in control of their
choices.  In  particular,  we  can  assume  that  the  imposition  of  meaning  is
something that happens by virtue of group norms constraining the individuals'
actions. While no individual alone can ensure through their choices that the
norms will change, the structure of mutual attribution of authority enables the
group of all members acting together to achieve a range of different outcomes.
Therefore,  the  group  as  a  whole  has  control  over  normatively  significant
outcomes even in the absence of joint intentions.78 Regarding Pettit's second
condition that groups must have an understanding of the moral significance of
their choices, this cannot mean that the group must already have  achieved a
shared understanding, but only that it must be in a position to develop a shared
understanding.79 Most dominant social groups are in such a position, as there
are mechanisms available that they can use to come to a shared understanding
– such as public forums or media channels through which the consequences of
their support of social norms can be discussed.80
While these considerations certainly do not solve all the puzzles about group
responsibility,  they  at  least  show that  the  groups  formed  by  the  dominant
members of social practices meet the conditions for collective responsibility
that are employed in the literature. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that
such groups can be held collectively responsible for oppression as long as they
78 While Shockley only considers norms that set up a common end for the group (which need not be shared by the
individuals  [Ibid.,  445.]),  his  argument  can be  easily  extended to other  forms  of  norm-governed practices:
whenever there is a set of norms present in a group that constrain individual agency in such a way that we could
say that the group is in control over how it collectively contributes to certain outcomes, then it is proper to
assign responsibility to the group. A similar importance of control is emphasized by May's “social existentialist
view” (see May, Sharing Responsibility, 33.) For collective control, see Hindriks, “The Freedom of Collective
Agents.”
79 Just as in the case of individuals, we must distinguish between culpable and non-culpable ignorance. In the case 
of groups, culpable ignorance can be an effect of the group having failed to attempt to achieve a shared 
understanding when making this attempt was something that the group was capable of doing.
80 Here, I ignore the possibility that cultural factors could make a group collectively unable to understand the 
moral wrongness of a practice. For this discussion, see Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, 
chap. 63.
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meet  certain  standards  of  collective  control  and  as  long  as  they  are  in  a
position  to  form  true  collective  beliefs  about  the  possibilities  to  change
oppressive  norms and  about  the  moral  wrongness  of  their  contributions  to
oppression.
That a group is collectively morally responsible does not entail, however, that
all its members are either fully or partly responsible as individuals. As many
have noted in the debate about collective responsibility, a group can be in a
position to make choices without any individual having a meaningful capacity
to make a difference.81 While, in many cases, individuals can make choices that
prevent some harm being done, it will only be the group that can be assigned
backwards-looking moral responsibility.
What does it mean to hold groups responsible without holding their members
responsible? This  question can only be answered once it  is  recognized that
moral responsibility is not a monolithic phenomenon, but rather a label for a
group of phenomena: to say that an agent is responsible means to say that it is
fitting to  adopt  a  certain  kind of  responsive  attitude to  the  actions  of  that
agent.  In  other  words,  to  hold  a  group  responsible  means  to  endorse  the
rationality of certain attitudes towards that group.82 To find out what kind of
moral  responsibility  is  appropriate,  it  needs  to  be  specified  what  kind  of
responses can be appropriate to group actions.83 Next to the most narrow types
of moral responsibility that are connected to the attitude of blaming and to the
response  of  punishing,  there  are  other  ways  of  holding  agents  morally
responsible that are connected to other responses.  In the case of  collective
agents discussed here, it seems appropriate to say that, for the members of
81 For instance, see Feinberg, “Collective Responsibility”; Lewis, “Collective Responsibility”; Isaacs, Moral 
Responsibility in Collective Contexts, chap. 2.
82 Cf. May's discussion of “moral taint” (Sharing Responsibility, 155).
83 Zimmerman, “Varieties of Moral Responsibility,” 59.
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such  groups,  the  right  response  to  membership  in  an  oppressive  group  is
shame – which one can rationally feel even if one is not guilty of any personal
failure.84 Fitting attitudes on the part of non-members can be  indignation  or
even contempt. Having such attitudes towards a group need not entail having
corresponding attitudes towards any particular member. Finally, we often hold
groups accountable by withholding certain forms of social status from them as
long as they do not take steps to live up to their responsibilities. A community
might, for example, deny an organization of veterans that have participated in
a colonial war the right to participate in debates about how to deal with the
aftermath of this war as long as this organization has not acknowledged its
responsibilities for injustice. If, however, the same individuals also happen to
form a chapter of the pensioner's union, they might be treated as legitimate
participants in this capacity. The moral status of the two organizations might be
significantly different even though they are composed out of the same people.
This shows that not only can we hold groups accountable without this being
reducible  to  attitudes towards the  individuals,  it  also  shows that  this  often
involves forms of moral responsibility that differ from the most narrow case
that is typically discussed in relation to individuals.
These considerations suggest further responses to Young's argument against
backward-looking  responsibility  attribution:  First,  attributions  of  group
responsibility  need  not  single  out  individuals,  but  they  can  target  them as
group  members  which  encourages  them  to  see  themselves  in  their  social
connections  to  others.85 Second,  this  account  does  not  attribute  excessive
responsibility to the oppressed. The oppressed members of a social practice
have only a very general responsibility to fight oppression that does not single
84 For the possibility of the group qua group feeling guilt, see also Tollefsen, “The Rationality of Collective Guilt.”
85 Nussbaum, “Foreword,” xxiv.
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them out from bystanders.86
4.2 Shared responsibility of individual group members
While the argument for the collective responsibility of the group of dominant
members  in  oppressive  practices  relies  on  the  unifying  character  of  such
practices,  there  is  another,  independent  argument  that  concerns  the  moral
responsibility of individual members. Larry May argues that people individually
bear some responsibility for harm that is caused by morally unjust attitudes
shared  within  a  group,  even  if  their  individual  attitudes  are  not  causally
involved in generating that harm and as long as they, by having these attitudes,
have subjected others to a  risk of being harmed.87 As an example, consider a
group of university administrators that have racist prejudices. While some of
them will  interview job applicants  with  a  minority  background and directly
cause harm by discriminating against them, others might have the “luck” of
only  interviewing  majority  applicants  and  therefore  not  cause  any  harm.
According to May, the latter also share responsibility for the harmful outcomes
caused by others for two reasons: First, the fact that they have the attitude
imposes a risk on job applicants. Second, their attitudes causally contribute to
the maintenance of a racist climate among administrators.
This argument seems to apply to the case of oppressive social practices. In
such  practices,  no  individual  attitude  is  necessary  or  sufficient  for  causing
harm. However,  by taking up certain attitudes individuals  impose a risk on
others. According to May, they therefore share in the moral responsibility for
86 Of course, as Young (Responsibility for Justice, 145.) argues, the victims of oppression might have a forward-
looking responsibility in terms of their having a special interest in ending the oppression.
87 May, Sharing Responsibility, 46–52.
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the harm caused by the practice as a whole. However, there are reasons to be
skeptical about this argument. It is true that having racist attitudes subjects
others to the risk that they will suffer discrimination. However, as long as no
actual discrimination is caused by an individual's attitude, the only action for
which such an individual seems to be responsible is the action of  subjecting
others to such risk (which may, however, itself be counted as harming them).88
It  is not clear why such a person should also be responsible for the  actual
discrimination caused by others.  Only  when we see that  attitudes in  social
practices do not do their work in isolation from each other but that they impose
meaning by virtue of the particular way in which they are linked to each other,
can we then see how individual  people  can be responsible  for  the harmful
outcome of a practice: their attitudes are implicated in the existence of a social
norm that generates obstacles for others who might try to change it. According
to this argument, people are not only responsible for the harm caused by racist
practices  because  their  racist  attitudes  directly  cause  such  harm,  but  also
because their recognition of the authority of others to enforce racist standards
stabilizes a system of racist norms. This can be captured using May's “climate”
condition: on this line of argument, membership in the dominant group leads to
some  individual  responsibility,  not  because  it  imposes  risks  on  others  but
because it enables others to perform unjust actions. Thus, while members of
the  dominant  group  are  not  individually  responsible  for  the  existence  of
oppressive practices, they are responsible for enabling that group as a whole to
impose  the  relevant  constraints  on  subordinate  members  and  to  generate
unjust outcomes. It is important to note that this individual responsibility will
usually rationalize forms of moral censure which are not as strong as those
88 It is unclear whether subjecting others to risk should count as a harm. See Hayenhjelm and Wolff, “The Moral 
Problem of Risk Impositions”; Finkelstein, “Is Risk a Harm?”
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which are justified towards the group.  In addition,  the degree of  individual
responsibility varies with the individual's capacity to challenge the acceptance
of oppressive rules and with the degree in which someone is in a position to
know about the possibility that such norms can be changed by social action and
about the moral wrongness of their participation. The members of a dominant
group have  by definition  some capacity to challenge norms. If they are in a
position  to  know  that  these  norms  could  be  changed  by  their  refusal  to
participate in their  upholding and that their participation is morally wrong,
then they bear at least some individual responsibility for enabling the actual
unjust  actions  by  upholding  oppressive  norms.  They  can  only  avoid
responsibility by undermining the force of oppressive norms as far as possible
or by disassociating themselves from the practice.89 The oppressed members –
also by definition – bear only a small amount of individual responsibility, as they
have the least social power to challenge its rules.90 It follows that there is a
source of  individual  responsibility for oppression that is independent of  the
attribution of responsibility to the group.
5. Conclusion
Understanding oppression as a matter of social practices that create obstacles
for social change provides us with two insights into the distribution of moral
responsibility  for  oppression:  First,  it  makes  clear  that  there  is  an
unproblematic  sense  in  which  groups  can  bear  irreducible  collective
responsibility for the outcomes of social practices and it allows us to attribute
89 Disassociating oneself from the practice usually means to not only intentionally disrupt one's disposition to 
attribute authority to others concerning the contested norms, but also to intentionally use one's authority to try to
effect normative change.
90 See for other arguments Hay, “The Obligation to Resist Oppression”; Boxill, “The Responsibility of the 
Oppressed to Resist Their Own Oppression.”
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such responsibility  to  groups  that  do not  count  as  agents  in  the  corporate
sense.  Second,  it  clarifies  the  foundation  of  attributions  of  individual
responsibility. Even though dominant members of oppressive practice are not
personally  implicated  in  all  particular  instances  of  harm  caused  by  these
practices, by participating in a structure of mutual recognition that supports
oppressive norms, they enable the harm being caused.  It  follows that when
there  is  oppression,  there  almost  always  is  a  group  that  is  collectively
responsible  for  it,  and  there  are  often  individuals  that  share  in  this
responsibility.91
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